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THE LAWYER’S “PRISONER’S DILEMMA”:  
DUTY AND SELF-DEFENSE IN POSTCONVICTION 
INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIMS 
Jenna C. Newmark* 
 
Many criminal defendants who face significant sentences and are 
unsuccessful on appeal petition for collateral habeas corpus relief.  One 
common ground for postconviction relief is that defense counsel was 
unconstitutionally ineffective before, during, or after trial.  This presents an 
ethical dilemma for those defense attorneys who have withdrawn from 
representation and are accused of being ineffective.  Should an accused 
lawyer disclose confidential client information to the prosecution in self-
defense against these claims?  Or should the lawyer, even in the face of 
attacks on his work, help his former client in substantiating ineffectiveness 
claims?  Lawyers and courts must balance the competing interests that 
underlie the relevant Model Rules of Professional Conduct (or 
corresponding ethical rules in each jurisdiction) to determine which course 
of action is appropriate. 
Some courts permit (or even require) trial counsel to disclose 
confidential client information in defense against ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims.  Such disclosures may be justified because, under the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer’s duty to keep client information 
confidential may be limited by an ability to defend himself against charges 
of wrongful conduct.  However, some commentators argue that, 
notwithstanding attacks on his work, a lawyer accused of ineffectiveness 
should not exercise his right to self-defense and should instead provide 
information to his former client to help substantiate ineffectiveness claims. 
This Note examines both theories of a lawyer’s role in the postconviction 
context and concludes that trial counsel should not invoke the 
confidentiality duty’s self-defense exception to respond to ineffectiveness 
claims.  The interests that underlie the confidentiality duty are paramount 
and should not be undermined in response to claims that pose little threat to 
a lawyer’s career.  Additionally, this Note argues that a lawyer has a 
limited duty to turn over files and documents relating to representation to 
his former client. 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2007, Brown University.  
I would like to thank Professor Bruce Green for his insight and encouragement.  I also would 
like to thank my family and friends for their endless love and support.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Joseph J. Kindler was sentenced to death after being convicted of first-
degree murder.1  After his conviction was upheld by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court and his state petition for postconviction relief was denied, 
Kindler filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court.2  Among the grounds 
 
 1. See Kindler v. Horn, 542 F.3d 70, 73 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating the facts of Kindler’s 
trial). 
 2. See id. at 73–75.  Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), “a district court shall entertain an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 
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for relief was a claim that his trial lawyer, Daniel-Paul Alva, was ineffective 
during the sentencing phase.3  Alva submitted an affidavit in which he 
admitted to his own ineffectiveness, stating that, due to inexperience, he did 
not conduct a proper pre-sentencing investigation.4  Based in part on Alva’s 
affidavit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s grant of a writ of habeas corpus and order for a new 
sentence.5 
Similarly, Jonathan Kyle Binney was also convicted of murder and 
sentenced to death.6  After an unsuccessful appeal,7 Binney petitioned for 
postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance during trial and sentencing phases.8  Binney’s trial lawyer met 
with the South Carolina Attorney General’s office to discuss the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims against him.9  At the meeting, trial counsel 
made a copy of Binney’s entire file and submitted it to the Attorney 
General’s office for review, which then used the file’s contents to counter 
Binney’s petition.10  The South Carolina Supreme Court denied Binney’s 
application for relief and upheld his sentence.11 
As these two cases demonstrate, lawyers react differently when former 
clients accuse them of rendering ineffective assistance.  If a lawyer wishes 
to defend against ineffectiveness claims, the self-defense exception to the 
ethical confidentiality rule seems to permit him to do so.12  However, his 
ability to defend his own self-interest is limited by his ethical obligations to 
his former client.13 
After a criminal defendant has been convicted and has exhausted his right 
to an appeal, he may petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which would 
vacate his sentence.14  Many such defendants seek postconviction relief on 
the grounds that their lawyers rendered ineffective assistance,15 thus 
 
judgment of a State court . . . on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006).  For an in-
depth discussion of habeas corpus proceedings, see infra Part I.A. 
 3. Kindler, 542 F.3d at 75–76. 
 4. See id. at 84. 
 5. See id. at 90. 
 6. See State v. Binney, 608 S.E.2d 418, 419–21 (S.C. 2005) (describing the facts 
leading to Binney’s conviction). 
 7. See id. at 421. 
 8. See Binney v. State, 683 S.E.2d 478, 479 (S.C. 2009) (reviewing Binney’s petition 
for postconviction relief). 
 9. See id. 
 10. See id. at 479–80. 
 11. See id. at 481. 
 12. See infra Part I.B.1 for an explanation of the confidentiality rule and its self-defense 
exception and Part II.A for a discussion of courts that permit lawyers to defend against 
ineffectiveness claims.  
 13. See infra Part I.B.2 for an explanation of a lawyer’s duties to former clients and Part 
II.B for the view that a lawyer may not provide extrajudicial information to the prosecution 
and should provide substantial assistance to successor defense counsel.  
 14. See infra Part I.A for an explanation of postconviction habeas corpus relief. 
 15. See infra notes 30–31 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of 
ineffectiveness claims in habeas petitions). 
702 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
depriving them of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel.16  Criminal 
defense trial counsel respond to such claims in two ways:  (1) they 
cooperate with the prosecution in order to defend against attacks on their 
work, or (2) they provide substantial assistance to successor defense 
counsel.  The choice is crucial because the lawyer’s cooperation often bears 
heavily on the claim’s success—the defendant probably will not prevail if 
his former lawyer “vigorously contests” the allegations, but is much more 
likely to succeed with the lawyer’s assistance.17 
Part I of this Note explores the background of postconviction 
proceedings and the various ethical duties lawyers owe to their former 
clients.  Specifically, Part I discusses the duties articulated by the American 
Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the Model 
Rules)18 and the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers (the 
Restatement).19  Part II presents the different opinions as to whether trial 
counsel ought to assist successor counsel or whether he may assist the 
prosecution.  Part III argues that, because of a lawyer’s ethical duties to 
former clients and important public policy concerns, trial counsel should 
not assist the prosecution by defending against ineffectiveness allegations 
outside of court.  Part III also argues that the self-defense exception to the 
ethical duty of confidentiality should not apply to ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims.  Part III concludes that trial counsel has the duty to provide 
at least some information to successor defense counsel, but that he is not 
required to provide more assistance than handing over the file. 
I.  POSTCONVICTION PROCEDURES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICAL DUTIES 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees all defendants the right to the 
assistance of counsel in defending against criminal charges.20  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean not only a right to the assistance 
of counsel, but a right to the effective assistance of counsel.21  If a defendant 
believes his lawyer failed to effectively represent him, the defendant may 
 
 16. See infra Part I.A for the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel as the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
 17. Susan P. Koniak, Through the Looking Glass of Ethics and the Wrong Rights We 
Find There, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 7 (1995) (stating that, because defendants are 
collaterally estopped from bringing malpractice claims against their former lawyer if the 
defendant does not prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claims, trial counsel has an 
incentive to contest such claims); see also Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of 
Criminal Defense Attorneys:  A System in Need of Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 1, 27 
(explaining that a defendant is more likely to prevail on an ineffectiveness claim if aided by 
former counsel). 
 18. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2009). 
 19. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000). 
 20. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”). 
 21. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) (“[A] party whose counsel is unable to 
provide effective representation is in no better position than one who has no counsel at all.”); 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (interpreting the right to assistance 
of counsel as the right to effective assistance of counsel); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 
60, 76 (1942) (recognizing that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to effective 
assistance of counsel). 
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move to vacate his sentence in a postconviction petition, claiming that the 
ineffective assistance was a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.22  How a lawyer participates in the postconviction process is 
determined by the lawyer’s own interpretation, or the reviewing court’s 
interpretation, of a lawyer’s ethical duties to former clients.  This section 
will describe the postconviction process, ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, and the ethical duties a lawyer generally owes his clients after 
representation ends. 
A.  Postconviction Claims and the Strickland Standard 
After a court has rendered a conviction and imposed a sentence, a 
defendant may appeal the court’s decision.23  If the appeal is unsuccessful, 
the defendant may further challenge a conviction through collateral 
remedies in state and federal courts.24  Modern collateral remedies are 
derived from common law writs of habeas corpus, by which defendants 
would seek relief by filing a civil suit against the warden of the prison in 
which they were being held.25 
Today, a federal defendant may move to vacate a sentence “upon the 
ground that [it violated] the Constitution or laws of the United States, or 
that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the 
sentence was [excessive], or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.”26  
Similarly, a state defendant may seek habeas corpus relief in federal court if 
he believes his conviction is unconstitutional or violates federal law.27  
 
 22. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.7 (5th ed. 2009).  The 
denial of effective assistance of counsel constitutes a constitutional violation, a claim that a 
defendant may allege during a collateral proceeding. See id. (explaining that ineffective 
assistance violates the Sixth Amendment).  Additionally, indigent defendants have the right 
to court-appointed counsel. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) 
(affording the right to court-appointed counsel to indigent defendants); Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458, 464–65 (1938) (holding that the defendants’ inability to retain private counsel 
did not constitute a waiver of the right to counsel). 
 23. While there is no federal constitutional right to appeal a judgment, statutes and state 
constitutional provisions grant the right to appeal in all felony cases. See LAFAVE ET AL., 
supra note 22, § 27.1 (discussing the history of appellate review). 
 24. Id. at § 28.1 (explaining collateral remedies); see also Mackey v. United States, 401 
U.S. 667, 682–83 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing collateral remedies as “an 
avenue for upsetting judgments that have become otherwise final”). 
 25. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 22, § 28.1. 
 26. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2006). 
 27. See id. § 2254(a) (“[A] district court shall entertain an application for a writ of 
habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only 
on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 
United States.”).  For state prisoners to pursue a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, they 
must first exhaust all available state remedies. Id.; see also Eve Brensike Primus, A 
Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9 (2010) (describing 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254). 
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Habeas review is especially common for death penalty cases,28 because a 
defendant whose motion is successful receives a retrial.29 
One of the most common grounds for habeas relief30 is that a defendant 
was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right because he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel before, during, or after trial.31  Ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims typically arise on collateral appeal—rather than direct 
appeal—because direct appellate review may consider only the trial record, 
and ineffectiveness claims require an analysis of more than just the trial 
record.32 
It is extremely difficult and uncommon for one to prevail on an 
ineffectiveness claim under the standard announced in Strickland v. 
Washington.33  In Strickland, the Supreme Court articulated the test that 
 
 28. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 22, § 28.2(d) (explaining that collateral review has 
been “particularly significant” for death sentences). 
 29. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986) (describing the retrial 
remedy for successful habeas petitions); Kyle Graham, Tactical Ineffective Assistance in 
Capital Trials, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1645, 1653 (2008) (same). 
 30. See Eve Brensike Primus, Procedural Obstacles to Reviewing Ineffective Assistance 
of Trial Counsel Claims in State and Federal Postconviction Proceedings, CRIM. JUST., Fall 
2009, at 6, 7; David M. Siegel, My Reputation or Your Liberty (or Your Life):  The Ethical 
Obligations of Criminal Defense Counsel in Postconviction Proceedings, 23 J. LEGAL PROF. 
85, 91 (1999) (noting that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are “virtually guaranteed” 
for lawyers who represent capital defendants). 
 31. See generally JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE PRACTICE § 10 (3d ed. 2005) (listing types of ineffective assistance claims).  
Examples of ineffectiveness before trial include failure to move for change of venue; to 
challenge an improperly obtained confession; to investigate witnesses; or to move to 
suppress evidence. See id. §§ 10:17–10:29.  Examples of ineffectiveness during trial include 
failure to object to inadmissible or prejudicial evidence; to object to prosecutorial 
misconduct; to properly cross-examine or call witnesses; or to submit proper jury 
instructions. See id. §§ 10:30–10:56.  Examples of ineffectiveness after trial include failure 
to present mitigating evidence in a death penalty case; to bring appropriate post-trial 
motions; or to raise certain issues on appeal. See id. §§ 10:48, 10:57–10:62. 
 32. See, e.g., United States v. Warman, 578 F.3d 320, 348 (6th Cir. 2009) (declining to 
evaluate the merits of defendant’s ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal, noting that such 
claims are properly analyzed through collateral review); United States v. Lampazianie, 251 
F.3d 519, 527 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[A] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be 
reviewed on direct appeal when . . . it was not raised in the district court, because there has 
been no opportunity to develop record evidence on the merits of the claim.”); 
Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 735 (Pa. 2002) (“[A]n overwhelming majority of 
states indicate a general reluctance to entertain ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal.”). 
 33. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986) 
(noting that the standard for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims announced in 
Strickland v. Washington is “highly demanding”).  Since the Strickland decision, many 
commentators have criticized the standard for making it too difficult for defendants to 
prevail on ineffectiveness claims. See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 17, at 19 (noting that, 
because of the strong presumption of attorney competence, Strickland challenges are 
“exceedingly difficult to win”); Elizabeth Gable & Tyler Green, Wiggins v. Smith:  The 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard Applied Twenty Years After Strickland, 17 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 755, 764 (2004) (discussing the criticism surrounding Strickland and 
concluding that the test has “detrimentally affected” criminal defendants); Martin C. 
Calhoun, Comment, How To Thread the Needle:  Toward a Checklist-Based Standard for 
Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 414–15 (1988) 
(criticizing the Strickland test for being “nearly insurmountable” and “unnecessarily harsh”).  
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courts use to determine whether counsel was ineffective.34  In Strickland, 
the defendant, David Washington, pleaded guilty to multiple charges of 
kidnapping, robbery, and murder in a Florida trial court.35  Finding that the 
aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors, a judge sentenced 
Washington to death.36  After an unsuccessful appeal,37 Washington sought 
collateral relief in state court, but was denied.38  He then petitioned for a 
writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida, alleging, among other things, that his lawyer was ineffective in 
previous proceedings.39 
In reviewing Washington’s case, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that, to 
prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a habeas petitioner 
must show that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense.40  Courts need only determine that counsel comported with a basic 
standard of competency, in light of “prevailing professional norms,” to find 
a lawyer’s actions objectively reasonable.41  Thus, a defendant has a heavy 
burden to prove that counsel’s errors were so egregious that he was not 
functioning as “counsel” within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment,42 
 
This criticism, though prevalent in commentary, is not the subject of this Note but highlights 
the obstacles habeas petitioners must overcome.    
 34. See generally Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (articulating a two-prong test to determine 
whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance). 
 35. See id. at 671–72. 
 36. See id. at 672–75. 
 37. See Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658, 667 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam) (upholding 
Washington’s convictions and sentences), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 937 (1979). 
 38. See Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285, 286–87 (Fla. 1981) (affirming the trial 
court’s denial of postconviction relief). 
 39. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 678.  
 40. See id. at 687–95 (establishing the two-prong test); see also Knowles v. Mirzayance, 
129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009) (“Strickland requires a defendant to establish deficient 
performance and prejudice.”); Graham, supra note 29, at 1653 (describing the two prongs of 
the Strickland test as the “essential elements of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim”). 
 41. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (noting that courts should look at “whether, in light 
of all the circumstances, the [alleged] acts or omissions were outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance”); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) 
(explaining that, while there are no “specific guidelines” for adequate attorney performance, 
courts should look at “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688)); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 
U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (“[T]he defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel’s 
representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms . . . .” (citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89)). 
 42. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 
146–47 (2006) (explaining that ineffective assistance of counsel violates the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel); Christopher M. Johnson, Not for Love or Money:  Appointing 
a Public Defender To Litigate a Claim of Ineffective Assistance Involving Another Public 
Defender, 78 MISS. L.J. 69, 75 (2008) (observing that, under Strickland, a defendant must 
show that his lawyer’s performance was “very poor indeed” to make a successful 
ineffectiveness claim).  The Sixth Amendment guarantees not only the right to the assistance 
of counsel in criminal proceedings, but the right to the effective assistance of counsel in such 
proceedings. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying discussion of the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the right to counsel. 
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and that the acts or omissions were not the result of a valid strategy.43  The 
inquiry must be “highly deferential” to the accused lawyer’s performance 
and presume that counsel exercised adequate professional judgment.44 
A court may dispense with the reasonableness inquiry and consider the 
prejudice prong first.45  To show prejudice, a defendant must establish that 
there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient 
performance, the proceeding would have yielded a different result.46  
Prejudice rests on whether the attorney’s performance undermined the 
confidence and overall fairness of the proceeding,47 although courts should 
presume that the proceeding was fair.48  With strong presumptions of 
attorney competence and fairness to overcome, it is very difficult for a 
defendant to succeed on an ineffectiveness claim.49 
The Strickland Court imposed a high standard to discourage 
ineffectiveness challenges.50  If the standard were less deferential to 
attorney performance, “[c]riminal trials resolved unfavorably to the 
defendant would increasingly come to be followed by a second trial,” 
 
 43. See Knowles, 129 S. Ct. at 1421 (explaining that a lawyer’s decisions  resulting from 
thorough investigation are “virtually unchallengeable” (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690)); 
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 22, § 11.10(c) (explaining that courts must give great deference 
to counsel’s strategic choices, so long as the lawyer completely investigated the case). 
 44. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see also Duncan, supra note 17, at 21–22 (noting the 
strong presumption that a lawyer acted within the wide range of reasonable professional 
conduct); Johnson, supra note 42, at 74–75. 
 45. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim 
on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course 
should be followed.”); see also Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147 (explaining that a 
constitutional violation is not complete unless the lawyer’s mistakes actually prejudice the 
defense). But see Calhoun, supra note 33, at 430–31 (criticizing Strickland for permitting 
courts to consider prejudice before attorney performance); Duncan, supra note 17, at 20–21 
(same). 
 46. See Knowles, 129 S. Ct. at 1422 (“To prevail on his ineffective-assistance claim, 
Mirzayance must show . . . that there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that he would have 
prevailed on his insanity defense had he pursued it.” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)); 
Graham, supra note 29, at 1654 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  “[S]ome conceivable 
effect on the outcome” is insufficient to establish prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. 
 47. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (defining “reasonable probability” as “a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in” the proceeding’s outcome).  The Strickland Court 
emphasized that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is actually an attack on the 
fundamental fairness of the challenged proceeding, so the inquiry should focus primarily on 
whether the defendant received a fair trial. See id. at 687, 697; see also Kimmelman v. 
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 395 (1986) (explaining that the prejudice prong of the Strickland 
test rests on whether the outcome of the proceeding was “fundamentally unfair”); Graham, 
supra note 29, at 1653–54 (discussing the necessity of finding a link between the lawyer’s 
performance and the trial’s fairness). 
 48. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 (“The assessment of prejudice should proceed on the 
assumption that the decision maker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying 
the standards that govern the decision.”); Duncan, supra note 17, at 16–17 (explaining that 
the Strickland Court emphasized that lower courts should presume that trials are reliable). 
 49. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 50. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; HALL, supra note 31, § 10:1 (“[T]he prospect of 
defending unjustified ineffective assistance claims filed by disgruntled convicted clients can 
have a chilling effect on zealous advocacy.”). 
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undermining judicial finality and efficiency.51  Widespread scrutiny of trial 
counsel’s performance would also discourage attorneys from accepting 
defense cases, particularly capital cases.52 
If a reviewing court decides the defendant has made a colorable 
ineffectiveness claim in his petition, it may choose to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether trial counsel’s actions or 
omissions were the result of valid strategy or mere incompetency.53  The 
decision to conduct a hearing rests on whether “a hearing could enable an 
applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations, which, if true, would 
entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.”54  Evidentiary hearings are 
rare in both capital and non-capital cases.55  During an evidentiary hearing, 
a court may find it necessary to inquire into the nature of counsel’s 
communications with the defendant to make a proper determination about 
trial counsel’s performance and may call the trial lawyer as a witness to 
testify about his decisions before, during, and after trial.56 
Usually, if a defendant does not prevail on his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, he is collaterally estopped from bringing a subsequent legal 
malpractice claim against the same lawyer he accused of being 
ineffective.57  Furthermore, in many jurisdictions, an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim, successful or not, does not subject the accused attorney to 
a disciplinary proceeding.58 
 
 51. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; HALL, supra note 31, § 10:1 (warning that, if courts 
consistently find lawyers ineffective, there will never be finality). 
 52. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; HALL, supra note 31, § 10:1 (explaining that 
widespread success for ineffectiveness claims would discourage criminal defense attorneys 
from accepting cases). 
 53. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474–75 (2007) (explaining how courts 
considering federal habeas petitions determine when evidentiary hearings are appropriate).  
Evidentiary hearings are unnecessary where the record clearly refutes any factual allegations 
found in the habeas corpus petition and may not be conducted if barred by statute. See 
Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474–75 (listing federal cases that have found no evidentiary hearing is 
required where the factual allegations in the petition are contrary to the facts contained in the 
record). 
 54. Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474 (citing Mayes v. Gibson, 210 F.3d 1284, 1287 (10th Cir. 
2000)), 481 (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct 
an evidentiary hearing because “[e]ven assuming the truth of all the facts Landrigan sought 
to prove at the evidentiary hearing, he still could not be granted federal habeas relief”). 
 55. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 22, § 28.7. 
 56. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (explaining that a court may find the inquiry critical 
to a thorough assessment of counsel’s trial or appellate strategy); see also Duncan, supra 
note 17, at 27 (“A successful [ineffectiveness] claim often inquires into defense counsel’s 
conversations and interactions with the defendant.”); Tigran W. Eldred, The Psychology of 
Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 43, 63 (2009) (noting that trial 
counsel’s testimony is usually crucial to the ineffectiveness determination). 
 57. See HALL, supra note 31, §§ 10:2, 31:16; Duncan, supra note 17, at 27; Koniak, 
supra note 17, at 7 (discussing how the collateral estoppel rule incentivizes former counsel 
to defend against ineffective assistance of counsel allegations). 
 58. See, e.g., In re Steven Dean Applegate, Commission No. 96 SH 90, 1997 WL 
713726, at *11–13 (June 30, 1997) (declining to professionally discipline a lawyer who was 
found to have rendered ineffective assistance); Anne M. Voigts, Narrowing the Eye of the 
Needle:  Procedural Default, Habeas Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1125–26 (1999) (“[I]neffective or incompetent counsel 
may have little to fear from state ethics boards.”). 
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B.  Lawyers’ Ethical Obligations to Former Clients 
Although a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel as 
grounds for postconviction relief will retain new counsel or represent 
himself, trial counsel still has a continuing duty to protect his former 
client’s interests.59  This section will describe the duties a lawyer owes his 
client after their formal relationship ends.  Part I.B.1 examines the duty of 
confidentiality owed to a former client and Part I.B.2 examines the duty to 
provide information to the former client.  The Model Rules60 and the 
Restatement61 guide lawyers and courts on these ethical duties. 
The Model Rules originated with the Canons of Professional Ethics, 
which the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted in 1908, and later, the 
Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code), adopted in 1969.62  The 
ABA adopted the Code as private law, governing lawyers who were 
members of the ABA.63  In 1978, the ABA changed the title of these rules 
to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (the Model Code), 
acknowledging that they served only as a model for state and federal courts 
and were not binding law.64  The ABA was able to persuade state and 
federal courts to adopt the Model Code as rules of the court.65  Even in 
states where the Model Code was not officially adopted, courts treated it as 
evidence of the law.66  In 1983, the Model Rules, which have since replaced 
the Model Code, became effective, and many jurisdictions adopted them as 
law.67  Those jurisdictions that have not adopted the Model Rules as law 
view them as persuasive authority.68  The ABA has amended the Rules 
several times since 1983.69 
Like the Model Rules, the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the 
Law Governing Lawyers is a resource that lawyers and judges use to 
 
 59. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2009) (duties to former clients); 
id. R. 1.16 (duties upon termination); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 33 (2000) (duties upon termination). See also Siegel, supra note 30, at 95–96 
(discussing lawyers’ duties to former clients in criminal cases). 
 60. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9. 
 61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 33. 
 62. See MARGARET RAYMOND, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAW PRACTICE 11 (2009) 
(providing a history of the Model Rules); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:  A STUDENT’S GUIDE, § 1-1(d) (2009) (same). 
 63. See ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 62, § 1-1(d). 
 64. See RAYMOND, supra note 62, at 11 (“The Model Code, like any model statute, was 
not the law anywhere—the ABA has no power to impose rules of professional responsibility 
on any jurisdiction.”). 
 65. See id. at 11 (“In the years following its adoption by the ABA, many states adopted 
Model Code-based rules of professional conduct.”); ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 
62, § 1-1(d) (“The ABA was quite successful in persuading state and federal courts to adopt 
its Model Code as law, an enacted rule of court.”). 
 66. See ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 62, § 1-1(d). 
 67. See Ria A. Tabacco, Defensible Ethics:  A Proposal to Revise the ABA Model Rules 
for Criminal Defense Lawyer-Authors, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 568, 573 (2008) (“Most state 
courts adopt the Model Rules with some modifications.”). 
 68. See ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 62, § 1-1(e)(4). 
 69. See RAYMOND, supra note 62, at 12 (discussing changes to the Model Rules since 
their initial adoption in 1983); ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 62, § 1-1(e)–(f) 
(same). 
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determine what the law is.70  However, unlike the Model Rules, the 
Restatement was not intended to be adopted as rules of the court.71  Rather, 
the Restatement is a series of principles that covers an array of areas that 
affect the practice of law.72  It aims to “nudge the developing case law in a 
particular direction,” and influence courts in interpreting the Model Rules.73  
Both the Model Rules and the Restatement impose duties after the formal 
attorney-client relationship ends.74 
1.  Confidentiality 
One of the most fundamental duties a lawyer owes to a former client is a 
duty to keep the former client’s confidences.75  A lawyer’s duty to keep a 
client’s secrets is apparent in the ethical rule of confidentiality,76 the 
attorney-client privilege,77 and the work product doctrine.78 
Confidentiality principles are rooted in agency law, by which a lawyer, 
the agent, acts on behalf of the client, the principal.79  According to agency 
law, an agent has a duty not to use or reveal the principal’s confidential 
information.80  An agent’s duty to keep the principal’s confidences 
continues even after the agency relationship ends.81 
a.  The Ethical Duty of Confidentiality 
A lawyer’s duties to former clients include the confidentiality duty owed 
to current clients.82  Nearly every American jurisdiction has professional 
 
 70. See RAYMOND, supra note 62, at 17. 
 71. See ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 62, § 1-3(a). 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. (describing the Restatement’s purpose). 
 74. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2009); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 33 (2000). 
 75. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.1.1 (Student ed. 1986) 
(“[T]he principle of the confidentiality of client information is well-embedded in the 
traditional notion of the . . . client-lawyer relationship.”); Michael H. Berger & Katie A. 
Reilly, The Duty of Confidentiality:  Legal Ethics and the Attorney-Client and Work Product 
Privileges, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2009, at 35, 35 (“Confidentiality is a fundamental tenet of the 
attorney-client relationship.”). 
 76. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (governing confidentiality).  For a 
discussion of the ethical duty of confidentiality and the difference between the ethical duty 
of confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege, see infra Part I.B.1.b. 
 77. See infra Part I.B.1.b. 
 78. See infra Part I.B.1.c.  
 79. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 250 (1943) (finding 
the principles underlying attorney-client confidentiality rules in agency law (citing 2 PHILIP 
R. MECHEM, SELECTED CASES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY, §§ 2297, 2313 (2d ed. 1898))); Fred 
C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 361 (1989) (“At the heart of 
attorney-client confidentiality rules is the notion that lawyers are clients’ agents, and often 
their fiduciaries.”). 
 80. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 8.05 (2006). 
 81. See id. § 8.05 cmt. c (“An agent’s duties concerning confidential information do not 
end when the agency relationship terminates.  An agent is not free to . . . disclose a 
principal’s . . . confidential information whether the agent maintains a physical record of 
them or retains them in the agent’s memory.”). 
 82. See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
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rules that prohibit lawyers from disclosing confidential client information.83  
Model Rule 1.6 governs a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality, stating that “[a] 
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client 
unless the client gives informed consent”84 or unless one of the rule’s 
exceptions apply.85  The ethical duty of confidentiality requires a lawyer to 
protect his client’s confidences at all times, both in and out of court.86  
Information is protected regardless of whether it is public and regardless of 
whether disclosure would harm the client or not.87  A lawyer has a duty to 
protect his former client’s confidences in the same way he would a current 
client’s confidences because the duty of confidentiality lasts forever.88 
Model Rule 1.9 governs a lawyer’s duties to former clients.89  Under 
Rule 1.9(a), a lawyer has a duty to avoid conflicts of interest between 
former and current clients without the former client’s written informed 
consent.90  More importantly, Rule 1.9(c) provides that a lawyer may not 
reveal information relating to a former client’s representation “except as 
these Rules would permit or require with respect to a [current] client.”91  
This part of Rule 1.9(c) implicates Model Rule 1.6, which outlines the duty 
of confidentiality a lawyer has to current clients.92  Similarly, the 
 
 83. See Zacharias, supra note 79, at 352 (explaining that professional codes in almost 
every American jurisdiction forbid attorneys to disclose client information, and that codes 
range from “nearly absolute prohibitions on attorney disclosures to general rules containing 
significant exceptions”). 
 84. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009); see also Patrick Shilling, Attorney 
Papers, History and Confidentiality:  A Proposed Amendment to Model Rule 1.6, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2741, 2742 (2001) (describing Model Rule 1.6). 
 85. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b).  For a discussion of when a lawyer 
may reveal a client’s confidences, see infra Part I.B.1.d, which discusses exceptions to the 
confidentiality rule. 
 86. See Shilling, supra note 84, at 2743. 
 87. Model Rule 1.6 does not contain an exception for public information; it simply 
protects all information related to representation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.6(a); See also WOLFRAM, supra note 75, § 6.7.2; Bruce A. Green, The Market for Bad 
Legal Scholarship:  William H. Simon’s Experiment in Professional Regulation, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 1605, 1634 n.126 (2008) (“Even publicly available information is subject to the 
confidentiality duty . . . .”). 
 88. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [18] (“The duty of 
confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated.” (citing MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(c)(2))); see also Prisco v. Westgate Entm’t, Inc., 799 F. 
Supp. 266, 270–71 (D. Conn. 1992) (noting that Model Rule 1.9 protects confidences after 
representation ends). 
 89. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2009) (outlining duties owed to a 
former client). 
 90. Id. R. 1.9(a) (“A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not 
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that 
person’s interests are materially adverse to [those] of the former client . . . .”). 
 91. Id.  R. 1.9(c); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 
01-424 (2001) (“[A] principal obligation[] of a lawyer to her former client [is] to continue to 
maintain the confidentiality of the client information learned during the course of the 
representation . . . .”). 
 92. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (confidentiality); see also GEOFFREY 
C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 461 (4th ed. 2005) (“[Rule 1.9] 
is a reminder that the lawyer also has a continuing duty of confidentiality to a former 
client.”). 
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Restatement describes duties to a client upon termination of a formal 
attorney-client relationship,93 providing that an attorney must refrain from 
using or disclosing client information.94  These ethical duties are essential 
to making a determination about the proper course of action for former trial 
counsel during the postconviction process.95 
The Restatement also provides that a lawyer may not use or disclose 
confidential information during and after representation “if there is a 
reasonable prospect that doing so will adversely affect a material interest of 
the client.”96  During representation, a lawyer must take reasonable steps to 
“protect confidential . . . information against impermissible use or 
disclosure” by others.97  Upon termination of the attorney-client 
relationship, a lawyer may not take advantage of a former client by 
“abusing knowledge or trust” gained through representation and may not 
use or reveal client information if doing so would harm a client’s material 
interests.98 
The purpose of this duty is to foster trust between lawyers and their 
clients, encouraging clients to fully disclose all information related to the 
course of representation.99  Client disclosure is important because it permits 
an attorney to make informed decisions about how to proceed with the 
representation.100  Maintaining confidentiality is especially important in 
cases involving indigent defendants, who are less likely to trust their court-
appointed counsel.101 
b.  The Attorney-Client Privilege 
The ethical confidentiality duty encompasses the attorney-client 
privilege.102  The attorney-client privilege is a construction of an 
 
 93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 33 (2000). 
 94. See id. 
 95. See infra Parts II–III. 
 96. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60(1)(a) (2000) 
(describing the duty to safeguard confidences). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. § 33. 
 99. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 54 (1998) (“The purpose of 
confidentiality safeguards, of course, is to induce clients to make disclosures to lawyers.”); 
see also Zacharias, supra note 79, at 364 (“A client who expects the lawyer to reveal 
embarrassing or damaging facts may not be willing to tell all.”). 
 100. See Zacharias, supra note 79, at 358 (“By encouraging clients to communicate 
information they would otherwise withhold from their lawyers, confidentiality enhances the 
quality of legal representation and thus helps produce accurate legal verdicts.”). 
 101. See Abbe Smith, The Difference in Criminal Defense and the Difference it Makes, 
11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83, 119 (2003) (“Clients who are unable to choose [their counsel] 
because they cannot pay for their own lawyer are more likely to be unsophisticated about the 
law, to feel more alienated in a legal setting, and to believe that their lawyer is not really 
working for them.”).  Ineffectiveness claims are most often brought by indigent defendants, 
so preserving trust and confidence is particularly important in such cases. 
 102. See Louima v. City of New York, No. 98 CV 5083(SJ), 2004 WL 2359943, at *71 
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2004) (finding the ethical confidentiality rule “broader than the common 
law [privilege] in that it deals not only with confidential attorney client communications but 
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evidentiary rule by which a lawyer may refuse to disclose or a client may 
prevent disclosure of communications between them in court.103  There are 
two important distinctions between the ethical duty and the testamentary 
privilege.104  First, the attorney-client privilege only applies whenever a 
lawyer may be called as a witness in judicial proceedings, whereas the 
ethical rule “applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought 
from the lawyer through compulsion of law.”105  Second, the privilege only 
protects communications between an attorney and his client, unlike the 
ethical duty, which protects any information related to representation.106  
Like the ethical duty of confidentiality,107 the attorney-client privilege 
protects communications indefinitely, even after the client’s death.108 
The privilege is supported by the same policy concerns that underlie the 
ethical duty of confidentiality.  Knowing that the privilege will protect 
communications between the client and his lawyer, the client will be 
encouraged to disclose to the lawyer everything relating to the particular 
course of representation.109  A client’s full disclosure allows an attorney to 
perform to the best of his abilities by ensuring that he will have all of the 
information available to make an informed, professional judgment about 
how to represent his client.110 
 
secrets as well”), aff’d sub nom. Roper-Simpson v. Scheck, 163 Fed. App’x 70 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
 103. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 states the general rule of privileges. See FED. R. EVID. 
501.  The rule recognizes privileges prescribed by the Constitution, federal laws, rules 
promulgated by the Supreme Court, and general principles of common law. See id. Professor 
John Henry Wigmore’s familiar formulation of the attorney-client privilege is: 
  (1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal 
advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) 
made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected 
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be 
waived. 
8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292 (John T. 
McNaughton rev. ed., 1961). 
 104. See WOLFRAM, supra note 75, § 6.7 (explaining the difference between the scope of 
the ethical rule of confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege); Shilling, supra note 84, 
at 2743 (same). 
 105. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [3] (2009) (distinguishing the 
attorney-client privilege from the ethical rule); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 68–86 (2000) (expanding on the attorney-client privilege). 
 106. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [3]; see also WOLFRAM, supra 
note 75, § 6.7.2. 
 107. For an explanation of a lawyer’s duties after the attorney-client relationship ends, as 
dictated by Model Rule 1.9(c), see supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
 108. See Swindler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 404–07 (1998) (holding that 
the attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client). 
 109. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (acknowledging that the 
privilege’s purpose “is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and 
their clients”); SIMON, supra note 99, at 54. 
 110. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (“[S]ound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends 
and . . . such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the 
client.”); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (noting that the privilege “is founded 
upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having 
knowledge of the law . . . which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when 
free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure”); In re Grand Jury 
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Under certain circumstances, the attorney-client privilege may be 
waived.111  The right to waive the privilege rests solely with the client.112  
Waiver may be expressly stated or implied by the client’s conduct.113  
Examples of implied waiver include when a client discloses otherwise 
privileged information to a third party,114 when a client uses the privileged 
information in court through testimony,115 or when a defendant makes an 
allegation against his lawyer that calls into question the client’s 
conversations with his lawyer.116  One such situation is when a defendant 
files a habeas petition and raises ineffective assistance of counsel claims on 
the basis that his lawyer gave improper advice.117  As will be discussed in 
Parts II and III, when the client disputes communications with his lawyer by 
claiming his lawyer rendered ineffective assistance, the extent of the waiver 
is often unclear.118 
 
Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 530–32 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing the important public policy 
concerns the attorney-client privilege serves). 
 111. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 103, § 2327 (explaining waiver). 
 112. See WOLFRAM, supra note 75, § 6.3.4 (“The duty to invoke the privilege . . . is 
defined . . . by the client’s own rights.”). 
 113. See Hawkins v. Stables, 148 F.3d 379, 384 n.4 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that a client 
may either expressly or impliedly waive the attorney-client privilege); see also RAYMOND, 
supra note 62, at 191 (offering an example of when a client impliedly waives the privilege). 
 114. See generally In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006).  In 
Qwest, a corporation had produced documents to government agencies to aid in an 
investigation, but then refused to provide the same documents to the plaintiffs in a securities 
class action suit, claiming that the documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege. 
See id. at 1181–82.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected the notion that 
the corporation had “selectively waived” the privilege and held that the privilege is waived 
when the client voluntarily discloses otherwise confidential information to an unprivileged 
third party. See id. at 1192, 1201. 
 115. See, e.g., Hunt, 128 U.S. at 470–71.  In Hunt, a civil action, the defendant offered 
testimony that included advice her attorney gave her. See id.  When her attorney offered his 
account of their conversations, his client objected, claiming that their conversations were 
protected by the attorney-client privilege. See id. at 470.  The Supreme Court found that, 
when the defendant testified about her attorney’s advice, she waived the privilege and thus 
the right to object to the attorney’s testimony about their conversations. See id. at 470–71. 
 116. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1178 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding the privilege 
waived when one “‘injects into this litigation an issue that requires testimony from [his] 
attorneys or testimony concerning the reasonableness of [his] attorney’s conduct’” (quoting 
GAB Bus Servs., Inc. v. Syndicate 627, 809 F.2d 755, 762 (11th Cir. 1987))). 
 117. See United States v. Sharp, No. 2:07CR19, 2009 WL 1867619, at *1 (N.D. W. Va. 
June 29, 2009) (holding that the defendant’s collateral attack on his attorney’s performance 
“squarely puts his attorney-client relationship with his trial attorneys at issue” and that the 
defendant thus impliedly waives the attorney-client privilege with respect to his 
conversations with those lawyers); see also Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th 
Cir. 1974) (explaining that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is an attack on a 
lawyer’s work and an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege); Laughner v. United 
States, 373 F.2d 326, 327 (5th Cir. 1967) (“The privilege is not an inviolable seal upon the 
attorney’s lips. . . . [Where] the client alleges a breach of duty to him by the attorney, we 
have not the slightest scruple about deciding that he thereby waives the privilege as to all 
[relevant] communications . . . .”).  For an in-depth discussion of ineffectiveness claims 
waiving the attorney client privilege, see infra Part II.A.2. 
 118. See Part II.A.2 (examining cases where courts find ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims effect broad waivers of the attorney-client privilege that extend to information 
generally protected by the ethical duty of confidentiality). 
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c.  The Work Product Doctrine 
Like the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine gives effect 
to confidentiality principles.  The work product doctrine, which is separate 
from the attorney-client privilege,119 protects from discovery an attorney’s 
work relating to representation.120  Work product is written work produced 
in anticipation of litigation, including “its intangible equivalent in unwritten 
or oral form.”121  Like attorney-client communications, work product is 
protected because a lawyer will be most candid in his work if he knows it 
will be immune from discovery by the opposing party.122  Uninhibited trial 
preparation facilitates truth-seeking, the ultimate goal of the criminal justice 
system.123  Work product is protected throughout litigation, unless the 
opposing side makes a showing of necessity to overcome these 
protections,124 or the client waives work product immunity.125 
d.  Exceptions to the Duty of Confidentiality 
A lawyer’s duty to protect confidential client information is not 
absolute.126  Model Rule 1.6 permits a lawyer to reveal information 
protected under the confidentiality duty in certain extraordinary 
circumstances.127  Under the confidentiality rule’s self-defense exception, a 
 
 119. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.11 (1975) (acknowledging that the 
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine are separate protections); Hickman v. 
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947) (same). 
 120. See generally Hickman, 329 U.S. 495 (establishing the work product doctrine). See 
also Nobles, 422 U.S. at 236–40 (applying the work product doctrine in the criminal 
context); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 87(3) (2000) (“[W]ork 
product is immune from discovery or other compelled disclosure . . . when the immunity is 
invoked . . . .”). 
 121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 87(1) (defining work 
product); see also Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511 (same). 
 122. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510–11 (noting that, as an officer of the court, a lawyer 
has the duty to advance justice, which is best done when a lawyer enjoys a high degree of 
privacy in his work); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.R.D. 130, 142 (D. Mass. 2004) 
(“[T]here is a need to protect the privacy of the attorney’s mental processes.”). 
 123. See Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238 (“The interests of society and the accused in obtaining a 
fair and accurate resolution of the question of guilt or innocence demand that adequate 
safeguards assure the thorough preparation and presentation of each side of the case.”); 
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511 (warning that, if work product were made available to the 
opposing party, “[i]nefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in 
the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. . . . [a]nd the interests of 
the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served.”); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 730 A.2d 51, 58 (Conn. 1999) (discussing the “detrimental effect” a “threat 
of disclosure” would have on the lawyer’s ability to effectively advocate for his client) 
(citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511)). 
 124. See WOLFRAM, supra note 75, § 6.6.3. 
 125. See id. § 6.6.2. 
 126. See Henry D. Levine, Self-Interest or Self-Defense:  Lawyer Disregard of the 
Attorney-Client Privilege for Profit and Protection, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 783, 783 (1977). 
 127. An attorney may reveal some information relating to representation to prevent 
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; to prevent the client from committing a 
crime or fraud; to seek legal advice about compliance with the Model Rules; to defend 
oneself; and to comply with a law or court order. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
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lawyer may reveal client information “to establish a claim or defense on 
behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client . . . 
or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s 
representation of the client.”128  Disclosures are permitted only to the extent 
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to protect his own self interest.129  
If a lawyer does reasonably believe it is necessary to make disclosures in 
connection with a judicial proceeding, he should make such disclosures “in 
a manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other 
persons having a need to know it” and should take measures to protect the 
confidential information.130  The Restatement also recognizes exceptions to 
the confidentiality rule, including an exception to protect a lawyer’s self-
interest when a client brings or threatens to bring a charge of wrongful 
conduct.131  Like the Model Rules, the Restatement allows disclosure only 
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to defend against 
such a charge.132  While the self-defense exception permits some disclosure 
when the lawyer and client are adverse to each other in some way, the 
lawyer may not “rummage through every file he has on that particular client 
. . . and to publicize any confidential communication he comes across [that] 
may tend to impeach his former client. . . .  [T]he probative value of the 
disclosed material [must] be great enough to outweigh the potential damage 
[of] disclosure.”133 
There are a limited number of situations in which a lawyer may wish to 
reveal information under the self-defense exception.134  These situations 
include civil malpractice claims,135 an action to recover a fee,136 a 
 
R. 1.6(b)(1)–(6) (2009).  It is important to note that all of the exceptions to the 
confidentiality rule are discretionary, not mandatory. See id. R. 1.6 cmt. [15] (stating that the 
rule permits but does not require disclosure under the excepted circumstances). See generally 
Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional Conduct, 91 MINN. 
L. REV. 265 (2006) (analyzing the difference between mandatory and permissive Model 
Rules). 
 128. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5).  Lawyers typically invoke this 
exception before or during a lawsuit with a former client. See Levine, supra note 126, at 783. 
 129. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b), cmt. [14] (“In any case, a 
disclosure adverse to the client’s interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary to accomplish that purpose.”); Levine, supra note 126, at 793 (explaining 
that, without the self-defense exception, lawyers will suffer injustice in some cases where 
their own interests are at stake). 
 130. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [14]. 
 131. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 64 (2000). 
 132. See id. 
 133. Levin v. Ripple Twist Mills, 416 F. Supp. 876, 886–87 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (evaluating 
the extent to which a lawyer may make disclosures in a situation where he is adverse to his 
former client). 
 134. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. [10] (describing situations 
where invoking the self-defense exception would be appropriate); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 64 cmt. c (same); see also WOLFRAM, supra note 75, § 
6.7.8 (same). 
 135. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [10]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 64 cmt. c; HALL, supra note 31, § 28:58 (listing situations 
in which a lawyer may invoke the self-defense exception); Levine, supra note 126, at 783, 
791 n.42 (examining malpractice cases in which courts permitted the defendant attorney to 
make disclosures). 
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disciplinary charge,137 a civil action brought by a third party,138 or any 
other adverse proceeding, including collateral proceedings where 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims arise.139  A lawyer need not wait 
until charges are filed or a lawsuit commences to invoke the self-defense 
exception.140 
A lawyer may, however, invoke the self-defense exception only in 
response to a legitimate threat to his interests.  In Louima v. City of New 
York,141 the court found that protecting one’s reputation does not warrant 
the self-defense exception.142  Abner Louima was involved in criminal and 
civil suits against several police officers who brutally beat him.143  Two of 
Louima’s attorneys made statements to the press regarding Louima’s case 
during representation and after withdrawing.144  The lawyers argued that 
they were simply responding to and defending against public allegations 
that they had engaged in misconduct.145  The self-defense exception to New 
York’s confidentiality rule,146 they argued, justified such a response.147  
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York rejected this 
assertion and concluded that “[m]ere press reports” about an attorney’s 
conduct do not justify disclosure of client information, even if those reports 
are incorrect.148 
The court also found that protecting one’s reputation is not the sort of 
attorney self-interest the self-defense exception aims to protect, unlike an 
 
 136. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [11]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 65 (allowing disclosures in actions to recover a fee); see 
also Nakasian v. Incontrade, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1220, 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (interpreting 
New York’s self-defense exception to permit disclosures in a dispute to collect a fee). 
 137. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [10]; see also In re Conduct of 
Robeson, 652 P.2d 336, 346 (Or. 1982) (interpreting Oregon’s self-defense exception to 
permit disclosure in response to a disciplinary charge). 
 138. See, e.g., Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190, 1196 (2d 
Cir. 1974) (holding that an attorney may disclose confidential information in response to 
potential charges made by a third party); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Pittsburgh v. 
Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon, & Co., 110 F.R.D. 557, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that a 
lawyer may reveal confidential documents in response to a lawsuit brought by a third party 
other than the client). 
 139. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Richardson v. McMann, 408 F.2d 48, 53–54 (2d Cir. 
1969) (permitting disclosure in response to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim), 
vacated on other grounds, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Levine, supra note 126, at 791 (observing 
that many cases in which the self-defense exception has been deemed proper involve 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims made in postconviction petitions). 
 140. See, e.g., Meyerhofer, 497 F.2d at 1195–96 (permitting attorney’s disclosures when 
threatened with a lawsuit, before a suit had been formally filed); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [10] (same). 
 141. No. 98 CV 5083(SJ), 2004 WL 2359943, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2004), aff’d sub 
nom. Roper-Simpson v. Scheck, 163 F. App’x 70 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 142. See id. at *76 (rejecting the notion that a lawyer may invoke the self-defense 
reputation when he disclosed information to a newspaper to respond to public accusations of 
misconduct). 
 143. See id. at *1. 
 144. See id. at *31–44 (detailing the lawyers’ disclosures to the press). 
 145. See id. at *73 (setting forth the lawyers’ defenses). 
 146. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 1200.19 (2007). 
 147. See Louima, 2004 WL 2359943, at *70. 
 148. Id. at *73. 
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action to recover a fee.149  This reasoning also appears in the Restatement’s 
confidentiality exceptions.150  While the Model Rules do not explicitly 
distinguish between the extent of disclosure permitted in different cases in 
which the self-defense exception may apply, the comments to the 
Restatement contemplate a notable difference in the permissible extent of 
disclosure for fee cases and the permissible extent of disclosure in other 
self-defense cases.151  A lawyer may use or disclose confidential 
information to resolve a fee dispute to the extent reasonably necessary to 
establish his claim for a fee152 because disclosures necessary to establish 
such a claim will not involve information that would embarrass or prejudice 
the client.153  For other self-defense purposes, disclosure is permitted only 
if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes such disclosure is 
necessary.154  The requirement of reasonable necessity does not permit 
disclosure in response to “casual charges,” such as comments not likely to 
be taken seriously by others.155 
Another confidentiality exception that is relevant in the postconviction 
process permits a lawyer to reveal information to comply with a court 
order.156  As with the self-defense exception, a lawyer may disclose 
information only to the extent reasonably necessary to comply with the 
court order.157  Courts may call the lawyer as a witness during an 
evidentiary hearing to rule on an ineffectiveness claim, in which case a 
lawyer will be required to testify about his course of representing his former 
client.158  Although “a court order may supersede the lawyer’s obligation of 
confidentiality under Rule 1.6, [this] does not mean that the lawyer should 
be a passive bystander to attempts by a governmental agency—or by any 
other person or entity, for that matter—to examine her files or records.”159  
Thus, when faced with a subpoena or court order directing a lawyer to turn 
over files relating to representation to a government entity, that lawyer has 
the duty to “seek to limit the subpoena, or court order, on any legitimate 
available grounds” to protect confidential information under Rule 1.6.160  A 
lawyer must also make a good faith effort to limit his revelations to the 
 
 149. Id. at *70 (citing First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Pittsburgh v. Oppenheim, Appel, 
Dixon, & Co., 110 F.R.D. 557, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)). 
 150. See infra notes 310–13 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of the 
difference between permissible revelations in actions to recover a fee and cases to defend 
against accusations of wrongful conduct). 
 151. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5) (2009), with 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 64–65 (2000). 
 152. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 65 (providing a fee 
dispute exception to the general confidentiality rule). 
 153. See id. § 65 cmt. b. 
 154. See id. § 64 cmt. e. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6). 
 157. See id. R. 1.6(b) cmt. [14]; see also  supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text for an explanation of the use of 
evidentiary hearings to evaluate the merits of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
 159. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 385 (1994) 
(commenting on confidentiality obligations when a lawyer’s files are subpoenaed). 
 160. Id. 
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extent reasonably necessary when testifying as a witness in an evidentiary 
hearing.161 
2.  The Duty To Provide Information to a Former Client 
A lawyer is obligated to protect his former client’s interests, not only by 
keeping his confidences,162 but also by providing information, which is 
considered client property, to his former client.163  The duty to provide 
information to a former client, like the confidentiality duty, arises from 
agency law.164  During the agency relationship, an agent has the duty to 
“use due care to safeguard” the principal’s property165 and then return such 
property to the principal upon termination.166 
In line with this principle, Model Rule 1.16 requires that “[u]pon 
termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent 
reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests.”167  Even if a client 
unfairly discharges his lawyer, the lawyer must “take all reasonable steps” 
to ensure that termination does not adversely affect the client.168  These 
steps include giving the client papers and property to which he is 
entitled.169  This Rule is not absolute, however, as a lawyer may keep 
client-related papers to the extent other law permits.170 
The Restatement’s provisions relating to the duty to turn over property to 
the client upon termination are similar to Model Rule 1.16.171  Under the 
Restatement, upon termination of the attorney-client relationship, a lawyer 
must surrender all property belonging to the client and, upon the client’s 
request, “allow a client or former client to inspect and copy any document 
possessed by the lawyer relating to the representation, unless substantial 
grounds exist to refuse.”172  Substantial grounds to decline delivery exist if 
 
 161. See id. 
 162. For a discussion of the ethical duty of confidentiality, see supra Part I.B.1.a. 
 163. See, e.g., Olguin v. State Bar, 616 P.2d 858, 860–61 (Cal. 1980) (disciplining a 
lawyer who failed to provide information and files to a former client’s successor counsel). 
 164. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text for an explanation of how the duty of 
confidentiality derives from agency law. 
 165. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.12 cmt. b (2006) (describing an agent’s 
duty of care towards the principal’s property). 
 166. See id. § 8.05 cmt. b (“Termination of an agency relationship does not end an agent’s 
duties regarding property of the principal.  A former agent who continues to possess property 
of a principal has a duty to return it . . . .”). 
 167. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(d) (2009). 
 168. Id. R. 1.16 cmt. [9]. 
 169. See id. R. 1.16(d) (“Upon termination of representation a lawyer shall . . . surrender[] 
papers and property to which the client is entitled . . . .”); see also People v. Turner, Nos. 
05PDJ080, 05PDJ083, 06PDJ089, 2006 WL 3353971, at *1 (Colo. O.P.D.J., Nov. 9, 2006) 
(disciplining a lawyer who failed to return files to a former client); HALL, supra note 31, § 
21:4. 
 170. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(d). 
 171. Compare id., with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS  
§§ 43–46 (2000) (governing clients’ property). 
 172. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 46(2); see also David 
M. Siegel, The Role of Trial Counsel in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims:  Three 
Questions To Keep in Mind, CHAMPION, Feb. 2009, at 14, 18–21.  
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the client has not paid fees, for example, but only if withholding the 
documents would not “unreasonably harm” the client.173 
Most jurisdictions adhere to the Restatement’s view, or the “entire file” 
standard, extending a client’s right to retrieve documents not only to the 
client’s property placed in the lawyer’s possession, but to the client’s entire 
file, including documents the lawyer produced.174  In one notable case, 
Sage Realty Corp. v. Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn,175 the New 
York Court of Appeals adopted the Restatement view176 and found that the 
client’s property rights to these documents were superior to those of the 
attorney.177  Upon withdrawal, the court concluded, a client should have 
access to work product as well as end product.178 
While this creates a presumption in favor of full access to the file, it 
would be permissible to prevent access to firm documents intended solely 
for internal use179 because, as some commentators assert, allowing lawyers 
to retain internal documents furthers important policy objectives best served 
by allowing lawyers to keep their work private.180  Such internal documents 
include those containing an attorney’s general assessment of a client, and 
preliminary or tentative impressions of issues recorded for the purpose of 
giving internal direction to facilitate performance of legal services.181  This 
exception protecting the secrecy of internal documents may be overcome by 
court order, and “the lawyer’s duty to inform the client . . . can require the 
 
 173. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 43(1) (describing 
situations in which it would be appropriate to retain client-related materials); id. § 46(4) 
(“[A] lawyer may decline to deliver to a client or former client an original or copy of any 
document under circumstances permitted by § 43(1).”). 
 174. See Fred C. Zacharias, Who Owns Work Product?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 127, 141 
(citing Sage Realty Corp. v. Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn L.L.P., 689 N.E.2d 879, 
882 (N.Y. 1997)).  
 175. 689 N.E.2d 879, 882 (N.Y. 1997) (holding that counsel’s former client is entitled to 
inspect and copy any documents which relate to representation and are in counsel’s 
possession, absent substantial grounds for counsel to refuse access). 
 176. See id. at 882–83 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 
43 (2000)).  In deciding to adopt this view, the court compared the Restatement view, which 
reflects the majority position, with the view adopted by a minority of jurisdictions. See id.  A 
minority of courts and ethics authorities classify work product as the attorney’s property, and 
only require an attorney to turn over end product to the client. See id.; see also Siegel, supra 
note 172, at 20 (discussing the different views of a former client’s access to his file and work 
product); Zacharias, supra note 174, at 141 (discussing the minority view of work product).  
Finding that the minority view “unfairly places the burden on the client to demonstrate a 
need for specific work product documents in the . . . file,” the court rejected the minority 
position in favor of the majority view, which presumes that the client is entitled to his entire 
file when the attorney-client relationship terminates. See Sage Realty Corp., 689 N.E.2d at 
882–83. 
 177. See Sage Realty Corp., 689 N.E.2d at 882; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 46 cmt. c. 
 178. See Sage Realty Corp., 689 N.E.2d at 882. 
 179. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 46, cmt. c. 
 180. Id.  (“The need for lawyers to be able to set down their thoughts privately in order to 
assure effective and appropriate representation warrants keeping such documents secret from 
the client involved.”); see also supra notes 122–23 (discussing policy reasons for protecting 
work product). 
 181. See Sage Realty Corp., 689 N.E.2d at 883. 
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lawyer to disclose matters discussed in a document even when the 
document itself need not be disclosed.”182 
In the postconviction process, a lawyer also owes his former client a duty 
of loyalty that is not explicit in the professional rules.183  Loyalty is an 
“essential element[]” of the lawyer-client relationship.184  Like the 
confidentiality duty and the duty to provide information to former 
clients,185 the duty of loyalty exists in the fiduciary relationship between a 
lawyer and his client186 and persists forever.187  A lawyer not only has the 
duty to be loyal to his client, but he is also obligated to act as a zealous 
advocate for the client’s interests.188  This implied duty of loyalty helps 
inform the determination about predecessor counsel’s role during the 
postconviction process.189 
II.  COMPETING VIEWS OF TRIAL COUNSEL’S ROLE DURING THE 
POSTCONVICTION PROCESS 
An ethical dilemma arises when, in a petition for postconviction relief, 
the defendant, having retained new counsel, accuses his former attorney of 
rendering ineffective assistance during trial, sentencing, or appeal.190  The 
accused lawyer must consider the ethical duties described in Part I.B to 
decide whether to cooperate with the prosecution and defend against 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims or refrain from helping the 
government and assist successor defense counsel instead.  Very few courts 
and commentators have directly addressed how to respond to 
ineffectiveness claims.  Of the few authorities that have done so, courts tend 
to protect a lawyer’s right to serve his own self-interest by cooperating with 
the prosecution,191 while commentators oppose this view, arguing that the 
ethical duties mandate substantial assistance to successor defense 
counsel.192  Part II.A presents the analysis of courts that permit or compel 
 
 182. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 46, cmt. c. 
 183. See HALL, supra note 31, § 9:4 (“The duty of loyalty underlies all the ethical 
rules . . . .”); WOLFRAM, supra note 75, § 4.1; Siegel, supra note 30, at 105–106. 
 184. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. [1] (2009). 
 185. See supra notes 79–81, 164–66. 
 186. HALL, supra note 31, § 4:6 (“The relationship between an attorney and client is 
highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential character, 
requiring a high degree of loyalty and good faith.”); Siegel, supra note 30, at 105. 
 187. See HALL, supra note 31, at §§ 4:6, 9:4. 
 188. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3, cmt. [1] (“A lawyer must . . . act with 
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the 
client’s behalf.”).  The Supreme Court has acknowledged that zealous advocacy is the 
touchstone of the attorney-client relationship and the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653–57 (1984) 
(explaining that effective assistance of counsel entails the defense vigorously advocating for 
his client’s interests). 
 189. See Siegel, supra note 30, at 105–06 (considering the duty of loyalty when 
concluding that trial counsel should assist successor defense counsel). 
 190. See Siegel, supra note 172, at 14 (identifying “conflicting ethical obligations” for 
lawyers faced with ineffective assistance of counsel claims). 
 191. See infra Part II.A (discussing the judicial view). 
 192. See infra Part II.B (describing the commentator view). 
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trial counsel to cooperate with the prosecution and defend against 
ineffectiveness claims.  Part II.B describes the commentary against 
cooperation with the government and for assisting successor counsel. 
A.  An Informed Prosecution:  The Judicial View 
Generally, courts have both allowed and required trial counsel to assist 
prosecution either through informal meetings or affidavits defending trial 
counsel’s conduct.193  Defendants challenge this cooperation with the 
prosecution by demanding a court order to prohibit counsel from doing 
so194 or moving to suppress the evidence the prosecution gathered from 
conversations with trial counsel.195  As this section explains, courts that 
reject these challenges do so based on three theories:  (1) that an 
ineffectiveness claim triggers the self-defense exception to the 
confidentiality duty,196 (2) that an ineffective assistance claim waives the 
attorney-client privilege (and therefore ethical protections of confidential 
material),197 or (3) that the court does not have the power to control trial 
counsel’s ex parte conversations with the prosecution.198 
1.  Applying the Self-Defense Exception 
Some courts permit trial counsel to broadly disclose confidential 
information on the theory that a lawyer has the right to make such 
disclosures to protect his own self-interest.199  When faced with an 
ineffectiveness allegation, it is the “inevitable reflex” of an attorney to 
defend himself.200  As discussed in Part I.B.1.b, Model Rule 1.6(b)(5)—the  
self-defense exception to the confidentiality rule—allows a lawyer to 
protect his own self-interest by revealing information where he reasonably 
 
 193. See, e.g., Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 728 (9th Cir. 2003) (permitting trial 
counsel to provide substantial information to the government); Wharton v. Calderon, 127 
F.3d 1201, 1206 (9th Cir. 1997) (allowing informal meetings between the state and trial 
counsel); State v. Lewis, 36 So. 3d 72, 80 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (granting the state access 
to trial counsel’s documents upon the judge’s private review); State v. Buckner, 527 S.E.2d 
307, 314 (N.C. 2000) (requiring trial counsel to turn over documents to the state); Binney v. 
State 683 S.E.2d 478, 480–81 (S.C. 2009) (permitting trial counsel to meet with the 
prosecution). 
 194. See, e.g., Wharton, 127 F.3d at 1207 (reversing the district court’s order to keep trial 
counsel from meeting with the prosecution). 
 195. See, e.g., Purkey v. United States, No. 06-8001-CV-W-FJG, 2009 WL 3160774, at 
*2–3 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2009) (denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence the 
government received from trial counsel). 
 196. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 197. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 198. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 199. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carver, 910 F. Supp. 551, 558–59 (D. Utah 1995) aff’d, 297 
F.3d 1036 (10th Cir. 2002) (using the self-defense exception to justify informal interviews); 
State v. Click, 768 So. 2d 417, 422 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (finding that the self-defense 
exception justifies compelling trial counsel to testify at an evidentiary hearing); Binney v. 
State, 683 S.E.2d 478, 481 (S.C. 2009) (using the self-defense exception to excuse trial 
counsel’s giving his file to the state). 
 200. Lawrence J. Fox, Making the Last Chance Meaningful:  Predecessor Counsel’s 
Ethical Duty to the Capital Defendant, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1181, 1185 (2003). 
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believes it necessary.201  Under the Model Rules, the self-defense exception 
allows for disclosure not only during a proceeding in court, but at any time 
in response to any allegation of misconduct, regardless of whether a charge 
has been brought or a proceeding has commenced.202  Courts permit out of 
court disclosures to the prosecution in self-defense through affidavits or 
informal meetings with the prosecution based on the plain meaning of the 
self-defense exception under Model Rule 1.6(b)(5), or the corresponding 
provision in that jurisdiction’s ethical rules.203  Two notable cases in which 
the court used the self-defense exception to justify trial counsel’s revealing 
information and allowed a lawyer to make broad disclosures are Bullock v. 
Carver204 and Binney v. State.205 
In Bullock, the defendant raised ineffectiveness claims against his trial 
counsel in a petition for postconviction relief.206  By the time the petition 
was filed, one attorney who had participated in the defense at trial began 
working for the Utah Attorney General.207  Although she had been screened 
out of the case, the state bar advised her that she should be able to defend 
against petitioners’ attacks, and the state court issued an order allowing her 
to do so through informal interviews and in-court testimony.208  The U.S. 
District Court for the District of Utah, after reviewing the petition, deemed 
the order valid.209  Based on the plain meaning of the self-defense 
exception to the state’s confidentiality rule, which mirrors Rule 1.6(b)(5), 
the court found that the lawyer was justified in refuting the ineffectiveness 
claims.210 
Similarly, in Binney, the South Carolina Supreme Court looked to the 
plain meaning of the self-defense exception to allow trial counsel to assist 
the government.211  In that case, the defendant, Jonathan Kyle Binney, 
applied for postconviction relief in state court and accused his trial lawyer 
of being ineffective at trial.212  A South Carolina statute provides that a 
lawyer accused of rendering ineffective assistance may freely discuss and 
disclose any aspect of the representation at issue with the government to 
defend against allegations, to the extent necessary to do so.213 
Binney’s former lawyer met with the South Carolina Attorney General’s 
Office and provided them with a copy of his entire trial file for Binney’s 
case.214  Because the defendant made numerous broad ineffectiveness 
claims, the trial lawyer concluded that it was necessary for the state to 
 
 201. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5) (2009). 
 202. See id. R. 1.6(b)(5) cmt. [10]. 
 203. See, e.g., Bullock, 910 F.Supp. at 557–58; Binney, 683 S.E.2d at 481. 
 204. 910 F. Supp. 551. 
 205. 683 S.E.2d 478. 
 206. See Bullock, 910 F. Supp. at 552. 
 207. See id. 
 208. See id. at 555–57. 
 209. See id. at 557. 
 210. Id. at 557–58. 
 211. Binney v. State, 683 S.E.2d 478 (S.C. 2009). 
 212. See id. at 479. 
 213. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-130 (1996). 
 214. See Binney, 683 S.E.2d at 480. 
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examine his entire file.215  When the defendant sought to suppress the 
evidence from his former lawyer’s revelations, the court denied the 
defendant’s motion.216  To make that determination, the court looked to the 
intent of the legislature and the plain meaning of the statute to determine 
whether the disclosures were permissible.217  The court concluded that 
Binney’s lawyer was permitted to turn his whole file over to the state for 
review where he thought it was necessary to do so.218 
2.  Finding Waiver in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 
Some courts reject challenges to trial counsel’s assisting the prosecution 
based on the theory that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a broad 
implied waiver219 of the attorney-client privilege, and that this waiver 
extends to information that is generally confidential but not privileged.220  
An implied waiver occurs when a client puts his communications with his 
attorney at issue.221  When a defendant brings a habeas corpus petition and 
alleges that trial counsel gave deficient advice, he is putting their 
communications at issue.222  The defendant thus impliedly waives the 
privilege with respect to those communications, and may not then insist that 
his former lawyer remain silent about them.223  The extent of the waiver is 
therefore determined by the breadth and nature of the ineffectiveness 
allegations, and because some defendants raise numerous ineffectiveness 
claims, courts permit their former lawyers to disclose a significant amount 
of confidential information, not only limited to attorney-client 
 
 215. See id. at 479 (explaining that the claims were too numerous to determine exactly 
which parts of the file were necessary to respond to them). 
 216. See id. at 480. 
 217. See id. at 480–81. 
 218. See id.  It is noteworthy that the dissent opined that, while the statute permits 
disclosures, it does not say anything about handing over entire files to the state. See id. at 
481–82 (Pleicones, J., dissenting).  The dissenting justice concluded that trial counsel’s 
actions in this case exceeded the scope of the self-defense exception under the South 
Carolina statute. See id. 
 219. See supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text (discussing implied waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege). 
 220. See, e.g., Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1974) (finding that 
ineffectiveness claims waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to communications 
related to those claims); Laughner v. United States, 373 F.2d 326, 327 (5th Cir. 1967) 
(same); Purkey v. United States, No. 06-8001-CV-W-FJG, 2009 WL 3160774, at *2–3 
(W.D. Mo. Sept. 29, 2009) (denying the defendant’s motion to suppress his former counsel’s 
117-page affidavit based on the theory that ineffective assistance of counsel claims waived 
the attorney-client privilege); State v. Taylor, 393 S.E.2d 801, 806–07 (N.C. 1990). 
 221. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888); Farnsworth v. Sanford, 115 F.2d 375, 
377 (5th Cir. 1940) (finding that, when “a client charges his counsel with misconduct and 
discharges them . . . . [h]e waives the privilege of the communication by himself making it 
an issue to be tried and testifying about it”); Levine, supra note 126, at 791–92; see also 
supra notes 113–17  and accompanying text (discussing implied waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege). 
 222. See In re Dean, 711 A.2d 257, 259 (N.H. 1998) (“Claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel go to the core of attorney-client communications.”). 
 223. See Hunt, 128 U.S. at 470; Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 716 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Laughner, 373 F.2d at 327. 
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communications (which are privileged).224  These courts allow disclosure of 
not only information protected by the attorney-client privilege, but also 
other information outside the scope of the privilege that is protected by the 
broader confidentiality rule.225  For example, courts in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit have found that, because a defendant waives 
the attorney-client privilege with ineffectiveness claims, the accused lawyer 
may provide “testimony, affidavits, or briefs” that contain any information 
to rebut the ineffectiveness claims.226  Some courts only permit trial counsel 
to cooperate with the prosecution outside of an evidentiary hearing under 
close judicial supervision, through in camera review.227  In these cases, 
when a defendant raises broad ineffectiveness claims, the court will perform 
an in camera review to determine which parts are irrelevant to the precise 
claims raised in the petition and then give the relevant files to the 
government.228 
One example of such a case is Coluccio v. United States.229  In Coluccio, 
the defendant filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court and sought 
relief based on the claim that his trial lawyer, Andrew J. Weinstein, was 
ineffective.230  Weinstein requested to submit an affidavit in which he 
would disclose certain confidential information that he believed was 
necessary to defend himself against the defendant’s claims.231  The Eastern 
District of New York stated that a client cannot use the attorney-client 
privilege as both “‘a shield and a sword’”232 and that a defendant who 
claims to have relied on the advice of counsel has waived the attorney-client 
privilege with respect to the communicated advice.233  The court looked to 
other similar Second Circuit cases, which all relied on the “shield and 
sword” waiver theory and permitted a lawyer to present evidence in his own 
 
 224. See Reed v. State, 640 So. 2d 1094, 1097 (Fla. 1994) (allowing trial counsel to turn 
over the former client’s entire file to the state to assist in responding to ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims); Waldrip v. Head, 532 S.E.2d 380, 386 (Ga. 2000) (“[A]ny waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege is not limited solely to the attorney’s testimony, but extends also to 
documents in trial counsel’s files.”). 
 225. See Reed, 640 So. 2d at 1097 (finding a waiver of the privilege also extended to a 
waiver of protection of other materials); Waldrip, 532 S.E.2d at 386 (same). 
 226. See, e.g., Bloomer v. United States, 162 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[O]ur cases 
require that ‘except in highly unusual circumstances,’ the assertedly ineffective attorney 
should be afforded ‘an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence, in the form of live 
testimony, affidavits, or briefs.’” (quoting Sparman v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 51, 52 (2d Cir. 
1998) (per curiam))); see also Cox v. Donnelly, 387 F.3d 193, 201 (2d Cir. 2004); McKee v. 
United States, 167 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 227. In camera review refers to a judge’s private review of evidence in his chambers. See 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 828 (9th ed. 2009).  
 228. See, e.g., Coluccio v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 2d 303, 305 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); 
State v. Lewis, 36 So. 3d 72, 78 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008); State v. Buckner, 527 S.E.2d 307, 
314 (N.C. 2000). 
 229. 289 F. Supp. 2d at 303. 
 230. See id. at 304. 
 231. See id.  Weinstein wrote a letter to the court requesting permission to make 
revelations before actually drafting such an affidavit, and the government requested that the 
court rule on the ethical issues implicated by the letter. See id. 
 232. Id. (quoting United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
 233. See id. 
2010] THE LAWYER’S ‘PRISONER’S DILEMMA’ 725 
defense through “testimony, affidavits, or briefs” containing information 
about the course of representation.234 Ultimately the court admitted 
Weinstein’s affidavit.235 
Another way a court tries to limit disclosure to the government is by 
ordering that any parts of files trial counsel hands over to the prosecution be 
kept from anyone but the parties working on the prosecution’s case.236  In 
Bittaker v. Woodward, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
permitted disclosures to the prosecution, but limited the use of such 
information to the Attorney General.237 
3.  Refusing To Enforce Confidentiality Outside of the Courtroom 
In an alternative approach, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit has found that, because the attorney-client privilege does not apply 
outside of the courtroom, trial counsel is free to provide information to the 
prosecution in an informal setting.238  In Wharton v. Calderon, the Ninth 
Circuit declined to interfere with trial counsel’s informal meetings with the 
prosecution.239  In that case, the defendant petitioning for postconviction 
relief sought an order forbidding trial counsel from having an ex parte 
meeting with the prosecution.240  However, the Ninth Circuit noted that 
courts do not have the power to regulate the extent to which trial counsel 
makes out-of-court disclosures to the prosecution, particularly because 
attorneys facing ineffectiveness claims are no longer appearing before the 
court.241  Such regulation, the court decided, would unfairly prejudice the 
prosecution by preventing access to information.242  Furthermore, because 
the court’s responsibility to protect the attorney-client privilege exists only 
within the courtroom, the court refused to regulate what an attorney could 
do outside the courtroom.243  The court noted that there is no explicit ethical 
rule that prohibits one attorney from interviewing another, and that 
regulating attorney conduct outside of the courtroom is the State Bar’s 
responsibility.244  Thus, informal, unregulated meetings between trial 
 
 234. See supra note 226 (listing Second Circuit cases). 
 235. See Coluccio, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 305. 
 236. See generally Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding a 
protective order that permitted only representatives of the state to use information in defense 
counsel’s files for the sole purpose of responding to ineffective assistance claims). 
 237. See id. at 717, 728. 
 238. See Wharton v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 239. See id. at 1206–07 (finding that the district court erroneously issued a protective 
order that prohibited trial counsel from meeting with the state to defend against 
ineffectiveness claims). 
 240. See id. at 1202–03. 
 241. See id. at 1206. 
 242. See id. at 1203; see also Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 722 (citing fairness as a reason to 
allow disclosure). 
 243. See Wharton, 127 F.3d at 1205 (“[A] court’s authority to ‘protect’ the attorney-client 
privilege simply does not extend, at least absent some compelling circumstance, to non-
compelled, voluntary, out-of-court interviews, any more than it does to an after-dinner 
conversation.”). 
 244. See id. at 1206. 
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counsel and the government were permissible.245  The court was not 
concerned about the prospect of the prosecution inducing Wharton’s 
lawyers to violate any ethics rules.246 
B.  Devoted to the Defense:  The Commentator View 
Although courts permit trial counsel to assist the prosecution, 
commentators urge lawyers to remain loyal to their former clients.  These 
commentators find that, instead, a lawyer has the professional responsibility 
to assist successor defense counsel in petitioning for ineffective assistance 
of counsel relief.247  This section first examines the commentary that urges 
a lawyer to protect confidentiality by not cooperating with the 
prosecution.248  Then, this section presents the commentary that states that 
the duty to provide information requires trial counsel to assist 
postconviction counsel.249 
1.  Confidentiality as a Limit to Self-Defense 
Commentators who urge former counsel to refrain from assisting the 
prosecution rely on the ethical duty of confidentiality.250  Confidentiality 
obligations promote trust between a lawyer and his client, and a lack of 
trust hinders the lawyer’s ability to make informed strategic decisions about 
the representation.251 
The Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility (Pennsylvania Committee) has analyzed the 
issue of whether former defense counsel may assist the prosecution by 
considering the ethical duty of confidentiality.252  The Pennsylvania 
Committee drafted an opinion in response to a case in which the 
government made a discovery request for trial counsel’s entire file, which 
would help the state to respond to a habeas petition that asserted ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims.253  In light of the relevant confidentiality 
considerations of the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, 
and the ethical duty of confidentiality under Model Rule 1.6, the 
Pennsylvania Committee determined that the file should remain protected 
from the government’s discovery requests.254 
 
 245. See id. 
 246. See id. 
 247. See generally Fox, supra note 200 (describing capital defense lawyers’ obligations 
during collateral proceedings); Siegel, supra note 172. (advocating the view that trial counsel 
should assist successor counsel during collateral proceedings).   
 248. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 249. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 250. See supra Part I.B.1.a–b (discussing the ethical duty of confidentiality and the 
attorney-client privilege). 
 251. See supra notes 99–101 (discussing policy justifications for confidentiality rules). 
 252. See generally Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, 
Informal Op. 72 (2002). 
 253. See id. 
 254. See id. at 6. 
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First, the Pennsylvania Committee looked to several notable cases that 
hold that an ineffectiveness claim waives the attorney-client privilege.255  
Second, the Pennsylvania Committee looked to the work product doctrine, 
and found that an attorney’s work product was discoverable if it was the 
basis of a lawsuit.256  Third, the Pennsylvania Committee noted that Model 
Rule 1.6 protects all information relating to representation, and that under 
Rule 1.6, counsel may not reveal the client’s file without the client’s 
consent or a court order to do so.257  In addition to Rule 1.6’s requirements, 
the Pennsylvania Committee concluded that it would be extremely difficult 
to determine which records would be useful and directly responsive to the 
ineffectiveness allegations.258  Therefore, defense counsel may present any 
potentially responsive files to the Court for in camera review to ensure that 
confidential materials remain confidential.259  Otherwise, the government 
still had the opportunity to call trial counsel as a witness in an evidentiary 
hearing.260  It would be unacceptable for the government to be able to “take 
a short-cut and seek a whole-sale inspection of” client files, because those 
records are protected under Rule 1.6.261  Thus, the Pennsylvania Committee 
concluded that the ethical duty of confidentiality would preclude 
predecessor counsel’s substantial assistance to the prosecution in such 
cases.262 
Professor David M. Siegel has briefly discussed a lawyer’s duty of 
confidentiality as a limit to the ability to respond to ineffectiveness 
claims.263  He acknowledges that an ineffectiveness claim effects some 
waiver of the attorney-client privilege and the ethical duty of 
confidentiality, but says the self-defense exception itself is confusing 
because it seems to enable lawyers to respond to ineffectiveness claims 
based on a few different rationales (as a disclosure adverse to the client, as a 
dispute concerning lawyers’ conduct, or as a former client issue).264  To 
provide clearer guidance to lawyers, Siegel proposes an amendment to the 
comments of Model Rule 1.6, which would specifically address 
ineffectiveness claims and permit disclosure “to the extent necessary to 
 
 255. See id. at 2–4 (citing Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1179 (11th Cir. 2001); 
Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2000); Tasby v. United States, 
504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1974); Turner v. Williams, 812 F. Supp. 1400, 1433 (E.D. Va. 
1993); Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 738 A.2d 406, 414 (Pa. 1999)).  
 256. See id. at 5 (citing In re John Doe, v. United States, 662 F.2d 1073 (4th Cir. 1981);  
Charlotte Motor Speedway, Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 125 F.R.D. 127, 130 (M.D.N.C. 1989); 
Donovan v. Fitzsimmons, 90 F.R.D. 583 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Truck Ins. Exch. v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 66 F.R.D. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1975)).  
 257. See id.; see also supra Part I.B.1 (discussing confidentiality). 
 258. See Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 
72, at 6 (2002). 
 259. See id. 
 260. See id. at 7. 
 261. Id. 
 262. See id. 
 263. See Siegel, supra note 30, at 108–11. 
 264. See id. at 109 (“Unfortunately, the concerns which the Model Rules address 
regarding disclosures point in different directions in the postconviction context.”). 
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meet the standard of reasonably effective assistance set forth in 
Strickland.”265 
Siegel is the only commentator who specifically examines the self-
defense exception to the confidentiality rule as justification for responding 
to ineffectiveness claims.  The few commentators who have made even 
fleeting acknowledgements to a lawyer’s ability to defend against 
ineffectiveness claims agree that a lawyer should resist the urge to protect 
his reputation and remain loyal to his former client.266  As John Wesley 
Hall, Jr. explains, being accused of being ineffective is a reality of the 
profession, and lawyers should not take such allegations personally.267  He 
urges trial counsel to be candid with the court and be honest during 
proceedings if the lawyer believes he rendered ineffective assistance, even 
if it means admitting to incompetent conduct.268  A lawyer may be 
somewhat embarassed, provided his peers read about the court’s decision, 
but otherwise, an ineffectiveness claim poses little threat to a lawyer’s 
career.269 
2.  Finding a Duty To Assist the Defense in the Duty To Protect Former 
Clients’ Interests 
Commentators who discuss a lawyer’s postconviction duties agree that a 
lawyer should assist successor counsel in asserting ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims.270  Under this view, the ethical rules “impose a duty upon 
trial counsel to fully and candidly discuss matters relating to the 
representation of the client” with successor counsel, even if doing so would 
disclose that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.271  This may be 
achieved by maintaining records of the case in a way that will “inform 
successor counsel of all significant developments relevant to the litigation,” 
giving successor counsel full access to the client’s files, “sharing potential 
 
 265. Id. at 111. 
 266. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 30, at 95–108 (arguing that a lawyer’s ethical duties 
limit his ability to respond to ineffectiveness claims); Voigts, supra note 58, at 1131–32 
(mentioning a lawyer’s duty to remain loyal to his former client by assisting habeas counsel). 
 267. See HALL, supra note 31, § 10.1 n.7 (“We chose this line of work, and we need to 
accept the risks that come with it.  Therefore, defense lawyers should not take 
[ineffectiveness claims] personally.”); see also Judge Anthony K. Black & Susan S. 
Matthey, Advice to the Criminal Bar:  Preparing Effectively for Allegations of 
Ineffectiveness, FLA. B.J., May 2008, at 49, 50 (warning that postconviction ineffectiveness 
allegations are “nearly inevitable” for criminal defense attorneys). 
 268. See HALL, supra note 31, § 10.68. 
 269. Koniak, supra note 17, at 10 (noting that a lawyer who is found to be ineffective 
suffers very few consequences as a result because of the collateral estoppel rule and a lack of 
discipline for attorneys who are found to be ineffective). 
 270. See Siegel, supra note 30, at 108 (urging trial counsel to “fully, openly, and without 
reservation cooperate with postconviction counsel”); Siegel, supra note 172, at 14; Voigts, 
supra note 58, at 1131. See generally Fox, supra note 200. 
 271. See Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 
127 (1992), available at http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=FxYHJ4sE3 
Ws%3d&tabid=839 (discussing trial counsel’s postconviction duties). 
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further areas of legal and factual research with successor counsel,” and 
cooperating with successor counsel’s legal strategies.272 
Those who believe trial counsel must assist successor counsel base this 
conclusion in part on the continuing obligation to protect former clients’ 
interests.273  A lawyer who represents a defendant in a collateral proceeding 
has the responsibility to explore all possible grounds for relief.274  
Providing full assistance to successor counsel will allow successor counsel 
to make a thorough investigation of potential ineffectiveness claims.275  
Failure to do so may result in meritless habeas proceedings because a 
legitimate ineffectiveness claim is unfounded.276  Thus, the trial lawyer who 
refuses to cooperate harms the client’s potential for relief, and by harming 
the client, counsel violates the duty to protect a client’s interests that 
persists even after the attorney-client relationship terminates.277 
Some find the duty to assist successor counsel in the duty to give a 
former client access to files relating to representation278 includes not only 
giving copies of the files that exist, but also filling in any informational 
gaps that exist in the files.279  This means that former counsel must “spend 
all the time that is necessary to bring habeas counsel up to speed.”280  This 
theory is based on the idea that both the lawyers’ opinions and strategies are 
work product that belongs to the client.281 
Some commentators interpret this duty as a duty to volunteer thoughts 
about strategy relating to representation as well.282  The California State 
Bar has said that, where successor counsel needs information that has not 
been put into writing, trial counsel must provide this information to his 
former client and successor counsel.283  The California State Bar’s Standing 
Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct (California 
Committee) addressed the precise issue of the extent to which a criminal 
defense trial counsel should cooperate with successor counsel in the context 
 
 272. Siegel, supra note 172, at 20. 
 273. See Siegel, supra note 30, at 95–96; Voigts, supra note 58, at 1130–31. 
 274. See Siegel, supra note 30, at 96 (“[S]trict new rules on the availability of successive 
collateral proceedings impose rigid requirements on the lawyer who represents the defendant 
in the collateral action to raise every potential ground for relief.”). 
 275. See id. at 106–07; Voigts, supra note 58, at 1131. 
 276. See Voigts, supra note 58, at 1130–31. 
 277. See id. at 1131; see also Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & 
Conduct, Formal Op. No. 127 (1992), available at 
http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=FxYHJ4sE3Ws%3d&tabid=839 
(interpreting an ethics rule requiring an attorney to release all client papers and property to 
client upon termination to include all impressions, conclusions, opinions, research, etc.). 
 278. See supra notes 169–82 and accompanying discussion. 
 279. See Fox, supra note 200, at 1190–91; Siegel, supra note 30, at 112–13; Siegel, supra 
note 172, at 20. 
 280. Fox, supra note 200, at 1191. 
 281. See supra notes 174–78 (discussing a lawyer’s duty to allow a former client to 
access his entire file). 
 282. See Fox, supra note 200, at 1191–92; Siegel, supra note 30, at 114; Siegel, supra 
note 172, at 20. 
 283. See Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 
127 (1992) available at http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=FxYHJ4 
sE3Ws%3d&tabid=839. 
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of the duty to return property upon termination.284  The California 
Committee concluded that, not only must trial counsel turn over to the 
client written materials generated throughout the duration of their 
relationship, but he must also provide the client with “other information not 
reduced to writing” if failing to provide such information would prejudice 
the client.285  A lawyer’s “impressions, conclusions, opinions, legal 
research, and legal theories prepared in the client’s underlying case 
ordinarily are ‘reasonably necessary to the client’s representation,’” and 
must be provided to the former client.286 
III.  THE PROPER RESPONSE:  PROTECTING CONFIDENTIALITY 
Even though courts consistently permit trial defense counsel to disclose 
confidential information to refute ineffectiveness claims,287 these courts 
disregard the importance of preserving confidentiality to serve judicial 
efficiency.  Thus, lawyers and courts alike should acknowledge that a 
lawyer’s ethical obligations require that he keep confidences and refrain 
from defending against ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  Part III.A 
argues that, in the ineffective assistance of counsel context, a lawyer or 
court may not use the self-defense exception to justify trial counsel’s 
assisting the prosecution to respond to ineffective assistance of counsel 
attacks.  Part III.B argues that, not only should trial counsel refrain from 
cooperating with the prosecution, but he must also provide a limited degree 
of assistance to successor defense counsel. 
A. Trial Counsel Should Not Assist the Prosecution 
Courts that permit defense counsel to provide substantial assistance to the 
prosecution, either because they apply the self-defense exception288 or 
because they find ineffectiveness claims waive the attorney-client privilege 
and conflate the privilege with the rule,289 fail to perform a thorough 
analysis of ethical duties.  They do not base these decisions on actual 
ethical considerations; rather, they subordinate these considerations to 
address prosecutorial and judicial convenience.  This section argues that, 
because the self-defense exception is meant to apply in very limited 
situations, and because the collateral impact of ineffectiveness claims on 
defense counsel is minimal, the self-defense exception should never be used 
to justify disclosures in response to ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  
This section also argues that, although ineffectiveness claims may waive the 
attorney-client privilege,290 they do not waive the confidentiality duty, so 
trial counsel should not disclose confidential information outside of an 
 
 284. See generally id. (answering the question, “To what extent must a criminal defense 
attorney, having been relieved by successor counsel, cooperate with new counsel?”). 
 285. Id.  
 286. Id.  
 287. See supra Part II.A and accompanying text. 
 288. See supra Part II.A.1 and accompanying text. 
 289. See supra Part II.A.2 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra notes 111–17 and accompanying text. 
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evidentiary hearing.  Lastly, this section argues that permitting outside 
cooperation with the prosecution undermines policy considerations that 
underlie the ethical duty of confidentiality. 
1.  The Self-Defense Exception Should Not Apply to 
Ineffectiveness Claims 
No matter how much an attack on his work offends a lawyer, it is 
improper for him to invoke the self-defense exception to justify responding 
to ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  The self-defense exception291 
permits a lawyer to disclose confidential information “to establish a claim 
or defense . . . in a controversy between the lawyer and the client . . .  or to 
respond to allegations in any proceeding.”292  It is intended to mitigate the 
substantial negative effects that keeping confidences may have on the 
lawyer’s interests.293  In instances when the self-defense exception is meant 
to apply, such as in response to a disciplinary charge,294 in response to a 
civil malpractice claim,295 or in an action to collect a fee,296 the potential 
harms to the lawyer are significant (disbarment, financial loss, etc.).  In 
contrast, the harms a lawyer seeks to avert by defending against ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims are minimal.297  Therefore, ineffectiveness 
claims are not a controversy for which a lawyer should invoke the 
exception.298 
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raise three collateral concerns for 
lawyers.  The first concern is the prospect of a civil malpractice suit; the 
second is the prospect of a disciplinary hearing; and the third is the potential 
for reputational harm.299  None of these concerns is realistic or serious 
enough to warrant the self-defense exception.  First, there is no threat of a 
civil malpractice claim because of the collateral estoppel rule, which bars a 
defendant whose ineffectiveness claim fails from suing his former lawyer 
for malpractice.300  Second, while some states require that all findings on 
ineffective assistance of counsel be reported to the state ethics board, 
lawyers are rarely disciplined for being ineffective.301  Therefore, the only 
threat an ineffective assistance claim poses to the accused lawyer is a 
damaged reputation.302  Any reputational injury only occurs if others read 
 
 291. See supra Part I.B.1.d. 
 292. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5) (2009)). 
 293. See supra notes 128–39 and accompanying text. 
 294. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 295. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 297. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 298. The ABA has recently issued an opinion adopting a similar position. See generally 
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 456 (2010). 
 299. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (addressing possible collateral effects 
of ineffectiveness claims). 
 300. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra note 269 and accompanying text. 
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the court opinion vacating the defendant’s sentence.303  Even if other 
lawyers and future clients do gain access to such an opinion, the opinion is 
still unlikely to be taken seriously enough to cause serious reputational 
harm.  Ineffectiveness claims are common in habeas petitions, particularly 
among those filed by capital defendants.304  As such, an ineffectiveness 
claim is an accepted risk associated with becoming a criminal defense 
attorney,305 so there is little stigma attached to being the target of such 
claims. 
An important example of where a lawyer tried to use the self-defense 
exception to protect his reputation is the Louima case discussed in Part I.306  
In that case, the lawyers who had revealed confidential information claimed 
that they did so to protect their reputations after being publicly accused of 
misconduct.307  However, the court found that, even though the lawyers 
responded to very public allegations, the threat to their reputation was 
insufficient to overcome their duty of confidentiality to their former 
client.308  Generally, allegations of ineffectiveness are not nearly as public 
as the newspaper articles in Louima.309  Therefore, the self-defense 
exception should not justify revealing confidential information in response 
to potential humiliation. 
To further understand why the self-defense exception does not apply in 
response to ineffective assistance of counsel claims, it is useful to compare 
an ineffectiveness claim to an action to recover a fee.  As discussed in Part 
I, the Restatement’s guidelines for disclosure in a fee dispute are more lax 
than those for disclosure when defending against charges of wrongful 
conduct.310  In a suit to recover a fee, a lawyer may divulge information to 
the extent reasonably necessary to establish his claim.311  For other 
situations in which the self-defense exception may arise, a lawyer may 
reveal information only if he believes it is necessary to do so and that belief 
is objectively reasonable, and he may not reveal information to respond to 
casual charges not likely to be taken seriously by others.312  Before 
deciding to reveal confidential client information, the lawyer must 
reasonably believe that he has exhausted his other options, that those other 
options will be unavailing, or that invoking them would substantially 
prejudice the lawyer’s position in the matter.313  Thus, making disclosures 
to defend oneself should be a last resort response to an imminent charge and 
not to a commonplace claim of ineffectiveness. 
 
 303. See supra note 269 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra notes 28, 267, and accompanying text. 
 305. See supra note 267 and accompanying text. 
 306. See supra notes 141–49 and accompanying text. 
 307. See supra text accompanying note 145. 
 308. See supra text accompanying note 148. 
 309. See supra text accompanying note 144. 
 310. See supra notes 150–55 and accompanying text. 
 311. Seee supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 312. See supra notes 154–55 and accompanying text. 
 313. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 64 cmt. e (2000). 
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2.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Waive the Testimonial 
Privilege, But Do Not Discharge the Ethical Duty 
It is a well-accepted principle that an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim that puts the attorney’s conversations with his client at issue 
impliedly waives the attorney-client privilege with respect to those 
communications.314  However, some courts have interpreted that waiver to 
extend not only to communications between the lawyer and the client, but 
to other information relating to representation.315  Courts that allow or 
require lawyers to have ex parte meetings with the prosecution or submit 
affidavits or entire files,316 justifying the decision with a theory of waiver, 
mistakenly conflate the attorney-client privilege and the duty of 
confidentiality.  This practice is improper because there are critical 
distinctions between the attorney-client privilege and the ethical duty of 
confidentiality317 that courts (and all parties, for that matter) should not 
ignore.  The attorney-client privilege only applies in very limited 
circumstances, protecting attorney-client communications during a judicial 
proceeding.318  The ethical duty of confidentiality is much broader; it 
protects all information relating to representation at all times.319  Therefore, 
attorneys should not volunteer, nor should courts order them to turn over, 
entire files on the theory that ineffectiveness claims waive the attorney-
client privilege.320  Entire folders are distinctly different from information 
about select conversations between a defendant and his lawyer, which 
courts and lawyers should acknowledge. 
3.  Policy Implications of the Defense Cooperating with the Prosecution 
Under either the self-defense exception or the theory of waiver, allowing 
a lawyer to provide information to the prosecution outside of an evidentiary 
hearing321 poses a great danger that the lawyer will overdisclose 
confidential information.  This undermines the policy interests that the 
confidentiality rule seeks to advance.322  When a lawyer hands over a file or 
agrees to an ex parte meeting with the prosecution,323 the lawyer risks 
disclosing far more information than necessary because he does not know 
precisely what information the reviewing judge will need to decide the case.  
Therefore, it would be unacceptable for trial counsel to voluntarily disclose 
information to the prosecution without being compelled to do so by a court 
order. 
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Even in instances where courts do seek to limit disclosure to the 
prosecution by requiring in camera review of trial counsel’s files, 
affidavits, and other statements,324 this practice does little to guard against 
overdisclosure when the revelations are initially made to the judge.  Where 
a lawyer turns his entire file over to a judge for in camera review, a breach 
of confidentiality occurs at the moment the lawyer reveals his file to the 
judge, regardless of whether the prosecution eventually views it.  If a judge 
is to determine what information he needs to decide an ineffectiveness 
claim, then a lawyer has no way of knowing precisely what information he 
should disclose to the court for in camera review.  Therefore, the lawyer 
will inevitably disclose more information than is reasonably necessary to 
defend himself. 
Because of the dangers of overdisclosure through less formal means of 
providing the court with evidence, a lawyer should not provide the 
prosecution with information relating to representation of his former client 
until the court orders an evidentiary hearing.325  As the Pennsylvania 
Committee found, an evidentiary hearing will give the government ample 
opportunity to elicit and present evidence by cross-examining trial counsel 
with close judicial oversight to limit such information to what is necessary 
for the judge to rule on the petition.326   Trial counsel must always take care 
to protect what is confidential and err on the side of nondisclosure, even in 
situations where a court orders him to make disclosures.327  This is the best 
way to ensure confidential information is protected. 
If judges and lawyers disregard the defense lawyer’s duty to keep from 
assisting the prosecution outside of an evidentiary hearing, that disregard 
will have detrimental effects on the attorney-client relationship and the trust 
that confidentiality protections foster.328  Whenever a court permits a 
defense lawyer to assist the prosecution, it perpetuates the feelings of 
mistrust and skepticism many defendants have towards their attorneys.329  
When a defendant petitioning for relief learns that his former lawyer 
disclosed confidential information not only to the judge, but to the 
prosecution, without his consent, he will trust his collateral counsel less.  
More generally, a policy that would permit a lawyer to do so would further 
discourage criminal defendants from confiding in their lawyers330 if they 
know there exists a practice of revealing confidences in response to 
ineffectiveness claims.331  This erosion of confidentiality and client trust 
would undermine truth-seeking and the integrity of the adversarial process. 
One may argue that keeping information from the prosecution would 
unfairly prejudice the government.332  However, as mentioned earlier, the 
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government (and the judge) may obtain all of the information it needs to 
answer a habeas petition during an evidentiary hearing.333 
B.  Trial Counsel Should Assist Successor Defense Counsel 
Not only does trial counsel have the duty to diligently protect the 
confidences of his former client and refrain from assisting the 
prosecution,334 he must also provide at least some assistance to successor 
defense counsel.335  This duty, which is not a choice but a requirement, is 
apparent in the duties to protect a former client’s interests, even after 
representation has ended.336 
Trial counsel should take care not to harm his former client and should 
provide information that would be useful in asserting ineffectiveness 
claims.337  Successor counsel has a duty to investigate fully the claims a 
defendant wishes to make and to advocate zealously for the defendant’s 
interests, just as any lawyer has with respect to any current client.338  The 
effectiveness of successor counsel depends on trial counsel’s willingness to 
assist.339  The trial lawyer who refuses to assist his former client risks 
harming the defendant’s interests by hindering successor counsel’s 
investigation of possible claims.340  By providing information to successor 
counsel, a lawyer will facilitate the fact-finding process and ensure that a 
habeas petition does not contain any frivolous, unfounded claims.341 
However, this duty to provide information that will help substantiate 
claims is governed by a lawyer’s interpretation of the duty to turn over the 
client file when the attorney-client relationship ends.342  As the 
commentators point out, the duty to assist successor counsel is also found in 
the duty to turn over property to the client upon termination.343  The Model 
Rules and Restatement require a lawyer to provide at least some assistance 
to his former client by providing the client with files and documents 
relating to representation.344  A lawyer may only retain such information if 
there are substantial grounds for refusing to do so.345  An ineffective 
assistance allegation is hardly substantial grounds for refusing to turn over 
documents because, as already discussed, these claims, unlike an unpaid 
fee, do not significantly threaten a lawyer’s interests. 
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Some believe this duty to provide information to the former client 
includes strategizing with successor defense counsel and volunteering any 
gaps in information that exist in the defendant’s file.346  However, the 
bounds of the applicable ethical rules are not clear.  Commentators 
overstate the duty to assist successor counsel in interpreting that duty as an 
absolute duty to strategize with and be prepared as a witness by the 
defendant’s new lawyer.  Trial counsel is not required to sit down and 
strategize with successor counsel; rather, if he so chooses, he may only 
provide successor counsel with files and documents relating to 
representation, limiting that information to written work product. 
CONCLUSION 
Lawyers ought to be aware of their ethical duties to their former clients, 
even in the face of attacks on their work.  For many defendants, ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims are a last chance for relief.  While it may be 
tempting for trial counsel to defend against ineffectiveness claims, 
especially those he feels lack merit, his ability to do so is limited by the 
ethical duties he owes to his former client.  As this Note explained, a lawyer 
must protect confidential information and refrain from viewing the self-
defense exception as justifying cooperation with the prosecution, despite 
various courts finding otherwise.  Furthermore, a lawyer must continue to 
zealously protect his former client’s interests by providing successor 
defense counsel with at least a minimal degree of assistance to adequately 
protect his former client’s interests. 
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